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THE PROCESS OF
RESPONSIBLE
DECISION:
OBSERVATIONS ON
THE JURISPRUDENCE
OF PROFESSOR JONES
EDWARD N. PETERS*
INTRODUCTION
Harry Willmer Jones has affected significantly the legal thought of
many judges, lawyers, academicians, politicians and students. For more
than 20 years he held the influential and prestigious titli of Cardozo Pro-
fessor of Jurisprudence at Columbia University,' and has authored more
than 75 articles and reviews on jurisprudence,2 legal history,s church-state
relations,4 legislative interpretation,' and contract law.6 Professor Jones
B.A., St. Louis University; J.D., University of Missouri at Columbia; member-of the Mis-
souri Bar; Western Director of the Intercollegiate Studies Institute, Claremont, California.
Professor Jones taught at Columbia University from 1947 to 1979, and was designated
Cardozo Professor in 1957. For a brief biographical sketch of Professor Jones' career, see
Resolution of the Faculty, 79 COLUM. L. RaV. 817, 817-20 (1979).
1 See, e.g., Jones, An Invitation to Jurisprudence, 74 COLUM. L. Rav. 1023 (1974) [hereinaf-
ter cited as An Invitation]; Jones, The Practice of Justice, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 133 [herein-
after cited as The Practice].
3 See, e.g., Jones, The Creative Power and Function of Law in Historical Perspective, 17
VAND. L. REv. 135 (1963) [hereinafter cited as The Creative Power].
4 See, e.g., Jones, Church-State Relations: Our Constitutional Heritage, in RELIGION AND
CoTEMPoRAYv SOCIETY 156 (H. Stahmer ed. 1963); Jones, The Constitutional Status of
Public Funds for Church-Related Schools, 6 J. CHURCH & ST. 61 (1964).
See, e.g., Jones, Legislative-Agency Disagreements Concerning the Construction of Regu-
latory Statutes, 36 A.B.A. J. 859 (1950); Jones, Some Causes of Uncertainty in Statutes, 36
A.B.A. J. 321 (1950); Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpreta-
tion of Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 2 (1939).
0 See, e.g., H. JONES, E. FARNSWORTH, & W. YOUNG, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CON-
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has written, edited, or contributed to at least nine books, delivered doz-
ens of special addresses and lectures before a wide range of audiences,
and even produced two films. 7 His writing is as light and entertaining as
that of an eloquent speaker;8 his speeches display a clear and precise
style. This study is intended as an introduction to the legal thought of
Harry W. Jones. A comprehensive presentation of his jurisprudence is
long overdue.
AN AMERICAN LEGAL REALIST
Professor Jones hails from that branch of legal thought-American
Legal Realism-which, despite the existence of European counterparts,9
has remained independent of any other jurisprudential approach. The
roots of American Legal Realism reach back to Oliver Wendell Holmes. 0
TRACTS (2d ed. 1972); Jones, The Jurisprudence of Contracts, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 43 (1975).
7 For a complete bibliography of Jones' published works through 1979, see The Writings of
Harry W. Jones, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 824, 824-27 (1979).
8 This Article is not the first to call attention to Jones' splendid writing style. See, e.g.,
Wise, Book Review, 15 AM. J. Jums. 175, 175-76 (1970) (reviewing H. JONES, THE EFFICACY
OF LAW (1969)).
' American Legal Realism may be compared to both the more theoretically inclined Scandi-
navian Realism, see R. DIAS, JURISPRUDENCE 484 (2d ed. 1964); D. LLOYD, INTRODUCTION TO
JURISPRUDENCE 497 (3d ed. 1972), and the German Free Law movement, see D. LLOYD,
supra, at 830. The Scandinavian Realists are a school of positive, empirical thinkers who
wish to eliminate metaphysics from the study of jurisprudence. D. LLOYD, supra, at 498, 500.
Led by philosophers such as Hflgerstr6m, Olivecrona, Ross and Lundstedt, the Scandinavian
Realists attempt to explain the law "purely in terms of observable facts." Id. at 500; see R.
DIAS, supra, at 484-92. The German Free Law movement, however, accords a judge wide
discretion in applying a rule of law. D. LLOYD, supra, at 830. The judge "may disregard [the
rule] if. . . the wording is calculated to lead to injustice.... [H]e is under a duty to apply
the rule which he conceives would have been formulated by the legislator if he had been
aware of the consequences." Id. at 830; see also Bodenheimer, Seventy-Five Years of Evolu-
tion in Legal Philosophy, 23 Am. J. Juius. 181,,198 (1978). American Legal Realism also was
distinctly hostile to the British empirical school derived from Hume and followed by Ben-
tham, Austin and Mill. Lloyd states:
For while it -is true that these thinkers were positivist and anti-metaphysical, they
were for the anti-formalists, not empirical enough, since they were associated with a
priori reasoning not based on actual study of the facts, such as Mill's formal logic and
his reliance on an abstract "economic man," Bentham's hedonic calculus of pleasures
and pains, and the analytical approach to jurisprudence derived from Austin.
D. LLOYD, supra, at 399-400 (footnote omitted). It should be apparent, therefore, that sub-
stantial differences exist between American Legal Realism and apparently similar European
movements.
10 One commentator suggests that American Legal Realism developed as early as 1897,
when Oliver Wendell Holmes' famous address, The Path of the Law, was published. See
Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 429, 429 (1934); Holmes, The Path of the
Law, 10 HAv. L. REv. 457 (1897). The realist approach experienced a "systematic formula-
tion" by 1912 with the writing of Joseph Bingham. Fuller, supra, at 429; see Bingham, What
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Throughout the Great Dissenter's judicial opinions and legal writ-
ings-and perhaps most clearly in The Path of the Law," which Jones
calls "the most influential piece of writing in the history of American ju-
risprudence" 11-Holmes laid the foundation of skepticism upon which
would rise the school of American Legal Realism."3
Receiving renewed impetus from Dean Roscoe Pound" and Justice
Benjamin Cardozo,' the new school developed rapidly through the first
third of the 20th century, peaking about 1930. From that point on, de-
spite the efforts of American Legal Realism's most respected apologist,
Karl Llewellyn," the school slowly declined, until by the late 1960's, lit-
tle, if any material specifically identifiable as American Legal Realism
was being produced."
is the Law?, 11 MICH. L. REV. 1, 109 (1912). John Chipman Gray also deserves note as a
pioneer of American Legal Realism. See J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW
(1916). See generally L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 538-46 (1973).
In a sense, the roots of legal realism may be said to reach back to the Middle Ages. See
Clanchy, A Medieval Realist: Interpreting the Rules at Barnwell Priory, Cambridge, in
PERSPECTIVES IN JURISPRUDENCE 176 (E. Attwooll ed. 1977). Clanchy discusses a register of
cases, compiled by a monk at Barnwell priory in the 1290's, which juxtaposes formal texts
from the plea rolls with a vernacular explanation of the origin and outcome of each action.
Id. at 176-77. According to Clanchy, "[I]ike an analyst of the judicial process of the realist
school, the author of the Barnwell register is an empiricist who reports cases in circumstan-
tial detail; although his purpose is not to draw general jurisprudential or sociological conclu-
sions, but to give practical advice on litigation." Id. at 177.
" Holmes, supra note 10, at 457.
" The Practice, supra note 2, at 139 n.9. See generally G. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE 645-48
(1973).
13 The exponents of realism insist there is no realist "school" of legal thought, but rather, a
movement with diverse positions representing a variety of viewpoints. See R. DIAS, supra
note 9, at 470-71; Fuller, supra note 10, at 430; Llewellyn, Some Realism About Real-
ism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1222, 1254 (1931).
" See, e.g., Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARv. L. REV. 697, 709-11
(1931).
" See, e.g., B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 81-95 (1924) [hereinafter cited as B.
CARDOZO, GROWTH]; B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) [hereinafter
cited as B. CARDOZO, NATURE].
" See, e.g., R. DIAS, supra note 9, at 473-75; D. LLOYD, supra note 9, at 403-13; E. POLLACK,
JURISPRUDENCE: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATION 788 (1979). Jones repeatedly calls attention to
Llewellyn's decisive role in the development of American Legal Realism, noting especially
Llewellyn's two pivotal law review articles, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to
Dean Pound, supra note 13, and A Realist Jurisprudence- The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L.
REV. 431 (1930). The best one volume collection of Llewellyn's legal thought is his work,
JURISPRUDENCE (1962). Readers of this journal need no reminder of Llewellyn's instrumental
service as Reporter in the drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code. See Gilmore, In
Memoriam: Karl Llewellyn, 71 YALE L.J. 813, 813 (1962). See generally K. LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION (1960); K. LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH (1930).
7 See D. LLOYD, supra note 9, at 414-15. Legal realism has engendered indirectly two other
movements still present today-Jurimetrics and Judicial Behavioralism. Id. at 415-23.
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But to say that American Legal Realism has virtually disappeared as
a movement is not to say that its influence has suffered a similar fate. To
the contrary, American Legal Realism has left an indelible mark on the
American legal landscape. Judge Jerome Frank's one-man wing of "fact-
skeptics," though criticized for conceptual overindulgence, has called per-
manent attention to the problems pertaining to judicial fact determina-
tion in a given case, even before moving to questions of applicable law."8
Moreover, the spirit of the "opinion-skeptics" lives on in a healthy tradi-
tion of suspicion that the rationale offered by the court as justifying its
holding is of little importance to it.19 Finally, the dominant branch of
"rule-skeptics ' 20 has introduced a potentially long-lasting "'distrust of
the theory that traditional prescriptive rule-formulations are the heavily
operative factor in producing court decisions'."'2 1 It has been this aspect
of American Legal Realism which has spawned the most rebuttal and re-
Jurimetrics "signifies the scientific investigation of legal problems, especially by the use of
electronic computers and by symbolic logic." Id. at 415-16. See Loevinger, Juri-
metrics-The Next Step Forward, 33 MINN. L. REV. 455, 474-93 (1949). Behavioralism, a
relatively new movement, has yet to develop a consistent theory regarding its aims and
methods. D. LLOYD, supra note 9, at 419. This movement evolved from realism and political
science. "From [realism, behavioralism has] taken the faith that judicial behaviour is pre-
dictable and [has taken] the aim of developing means of predicting decisions. From political
science... [it has] taken such techniques as scaling and small group psychology." Id. See
generally JunicIL BEHAVIOR: A READER IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 443-60 (G. Schubert ed.
1964); Schubert, Behavioral Jurisprudence, 2 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 407, 411-20 (1968).
" See D. LLOYD, supra note 9, at 404-05. "Fact-skeptics" attribute the unpredictability of
judicial decisions to the "elusiveness of facts." Id. at 404. They were primarily concerned
with the trial courts, since the "major cause of legal uncertainty [could be traced] to trial
uncertaint[y]." Frank, Book Review, Cardozo and the Upper Court Myth, 13 LAW & CON-
Tzmp. PRODS. 369, 384 (1948). Not surprisingly, fact-skeptics urged students to "abandon an
obsessively exclusive concentration on the rules." Id.; see D. LLOYD, supra note 9, at 405.
Critics of the fact-skeptics note that it is impossible to anticipate how a court or jury will
handle particular fact issues, while "innumerable factors combine to promote such uncer-
tainty and ... render it ineradicable." D. LLOYD, supra note 9, at 404-05 & n.27.
" See D. LLOYD, supra note 9, at 403 n.24. Opinion-skeptics espouse the position that "judi-
cial reasoning is ex post facto decision making." Id. Karl Llewellyn, for example, has been
labeled an "opinion-skeptic" by one commentator, and his writings appear to support this
charge. Id.; see, e.g., Llewellyn, supra note 13, at 1238-39. Not all observers agree that
American Legal Realism should be divided into three groups; most would drop "opinion-
skeptics" from the list. See D. LLOYD, supra note 9, at 403 n.24.
" "Rule-skeptics," according to Frank, concern themselves solely with appellate courts and
legal rules. Frank, supra note 18, at 384. He faults their position, primarily for the following
misconception: "if, at any time, the legal rules and principles of a legal system are in pretty
good shape, then ... so also is the judicial process of that system, regardless of whether the
decisions of the courts are needlessly unfair or unjust." Id. at 385.
11 Jones, Law and Morality in the Perspective of Legal Realism, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 799,
799 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Law and Morality] (quoting Llewellyn, supra note 13, at
1237 (emphasis in original)).
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joinder,3 ' and it is this branch which most clearly represents the ideas of
Harry Jones.
Professor Jones' "conversion" to American Legal Realism came at
the hands of Karl Llewellyn,' but the roots of that conversion reach back
to Jones' first days in law school, 4 if not beyond. "All my life," writes
Jones,
I have been more interested in processes than in products. When I see a
great picture in the Louvre or the Metropolitan Museum, the first thing
that occurs to me is not how beautiful the picture is but how the artist did
it .... [Likewise in law, I find] far greater interest in exploring the mater-
ials and methods of judicial decisionmaking than in formal analysis of the
logical content and possible doctrinal implications of specific judicial opin-
ions, however important.' 5
Before turning to the jurisprudence of Professor Jones, an under-
standing of the way in which he uses the term "jurisprudence" must be
acquired. Generally, the term "jurisprudence" connotes the study of legal
principle and theory, the philosophy of law." A second and less fre-
quently used meaning of "jurisprudence" is the study of legal method and
" See Law and Morality, supra note 21, at 800-02. An accounting of the polemical ex-
change engendered by the appearance of American Legal Realism will not be attempted
here. The breadth and depth of the debate is obvious upon even a cursory examination of
the literature. The Realists' focus on the decisional process as it actually existed was bound
to clash with the emphasis on justice and righteousness of the Natural Law tradition. See
id. at 800. A distinctive softening in the tone of the debate appeared around 1950. See
Bodenheimer, A Decade of Jurisprudence in the United States of America: 1946-56, 3 NAT.
L.F. 44, 50-53 (1958). Bodenheimer suggests that his softening was due to the fact that the
movement's "assault upon traditional legal doctrine" had subsided. Id. at 50.
An Invitation, supra note 2, at 1033-34.
s See The Practice, supra note 2, at 133-34.
" Jones, The Brooding Omnipresence of Constitutional Law, 4 VT. L. Rv. 1, 25 (1979).
This strong interest in the methodology of judicial decisionmaking is, I suggest, related to
the widespread interest in scientific method often found in liberal thought during the first
part of this century. Liberal thought was characterized by the idea that "[mlethod is
king-because things are [real] only in proportion as they are discoverable by the scientific
method; with the result that method logically directs all intellectual ... traffic." W. BucK-
LEY, Up FROM LniRLuIsM 144 (1968). The criticism brought to bear against such general
emphasis on methodology similarly may be directed against American Legal Realism. Id. at
179-82.
o J. HALL, FOUNDATIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE v (1973); G.W. KEETON, THE ELEMENTARY PRIN-
CIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE 4 (2d ed. 1949); M. SETHNA, JURISPRUDENCE 1 (2d ed. 1959). The
term "jurisprudence" has its roots in the Latin word "jurisprudentia," which means
"knowledge of the law." M. SETHNA, supra, at 1. That term had no generally accepted mean-
ing until the 19th century. R. DIAS, supra note 9, at 2. During the 19th century, due to the
writings of Bentham and his disciple, Austin, the word "jurisprudence" took on the meaning
"formal analysis of legal concepts" in both English and American law. Id. at 2-3.
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practice.27 It is this understanding of the term that lies at the heart of
Jones' jurisprudence and American Legal Realist thought, and both major
legal theories in the United States-Natural Law2 s and Legal Positiv-
ism'--have been criticized by American Legal Realists for neglecting this
secondary understanding of "jurisprudence" in their studies.3 0
Although we shall not take time here to develop the point, I would
suggest that much American Legal Realist literature, while renouncing all
interest in or need of statements of normative legal principle, actually
made such statements, though usually in such a manner as to blur the
distinction between their explicit descriptions of what the law is, and
their implied conclusions as to what it ought to be.31 One of the distin-
" An Invitation, supra note 2, at 1032; see D. LLOYD, supra note 9, at 10; infra note 30 and
accompanying text.
2 Natural Law, though defined in a number of ways, generally is thought of as a principle,
innate to the human mind, which guides human conduct. See H. ROMMEN, THE NATURAL
LAw 215 (T. Hanley trans. 1979). This jurisprudential position can be traced back to ancient
Greece and the origins of philosophy itself. Id. at 3. It often has been espoused by Christian
thinkers, who posit that such law comes directly from God. See Constable, What Good is
Natural Law?-A Lawyer's Perspective, 26 AM. J. JURIs. 66, 79 (1981). St. Thomas Aquinas,
one of the greatest Natural Law scholars of all time, defined Natural Law as "the rational
creature's participation [in] the eternal law." I THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 997
(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans. 1947).
" Legal Positivism is antonymous to the concept of Natural Law. See H. ROMMEN, supra
note 28, at 247. Its advocates contend that there is no such thing as innate law; there are
only commands promulgated, administered, and recognized by the state. Id. At least one
commentator traces positivism back to the early 19th-century attempts by philosophers
such as Bentham and Austin to "distinguish law as it is from law as it ought to be." Hart,
Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv. 593, 594 (1958).
" The Legal Realists stress the study of law in terms of legal method and process. See E.
BoDENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 124 (rev. ed. 1974) ("[Llewellyn] proposed that the focal
point of legal research should be shifted from the study of rules to the observance of the real
behavior of the law officials.. .... "); R. DIAS, supra note 9, at 475 (Realists examine, among
other things, what judges and courts do); E. POLLACK, supra note 16, at 787 (Realists pro-
nounce "that the law is what the courts and the officials do regarding legal cases"); Law and
Morality, supra note 21, at 802 ("The interplay of law and conscience is better seen in the
context of the decisional process than in disputations about the 'morality' or 'policy' of gen-
eral legal rules and principles"). Natural Law advocates and Legal Positivists, by contrast,
are concerned primarily with the relationship of law and morality. See, e.g., D. LLOYD, supra
note 9, at 8-10. One of the effects of the Legal Realist movement might well be a lasting
union of the two concepts of jurisprudence into one general study. See Twining, General
Preface to N. MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART (1981).
"1 For example, Jones quotes with approval Llewellyn's summary of the Realist position as a
"distrust of traditional legal rules and concepts insofar as they purport to describe what
either courts or people are actually doing," and thus a reluctance to use such rules in the
analysis of judicial opinions. Law and Morality, supra note 21, at 799 (quoting Llewellyn,
supra note 13, at 1237) (emphasis in original). Yet, in a later essay, Jones sets forth a defini-
tion of a good law as one that fosters a social climate in which the quality of human life is
enhanced. See infra text accompanying note 40. In this statement, we see not only Jones'
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guishing characteristics of Professor Jones' work, however, is that, with
only a few well-delineated exceptions, he does not concern himself with
considerations of legal theory. Instead, he concentrates almost exclusively
on the study of legal method and process. His approach is distinctly de-
scriptive, not normative. It reflects his very understanding of the Ameri-
can Legal Realist phenomenon: "American legal realism is not a system-
atic philosophy of law but a way of looking at legal rules and legal
processes. It has nothing whatever in common with realism in general
philosophy; indeed, legal realism's identifying characteristic is a skeptical
temper towards generalizations.11 2 Whatever the merits of this sharp dis-
tinction between philosophy and practice, 3 Professor Jones' adherence to
this separation greatly aids analysis of his legal thought.
UTILTARIANISM
Professor Jones' jurisprudence ultimately rests on the basic premise
that law is a means to social ends.8' Of course, the ramifications of such a
definition of a good law-with its strong utilitarian bent-but a rare (for Jones) normative-
like statement concerning the ends to which law is a means. By defining the role of the law
in society in this manner, Jones has established a "norm" by which a law's goodness can be
measured-an approach that apparently conflicts with his professed preference for judging a
law by the outcome of its application. See, e.g., An Invitation, supra note 2, at 1025; Law
and Morality, supra note 21, at 808.
, Law and Morality, supra note 21, at 799; see G. CHRISTIE, supra note 12, at 641-42 (Legal
Realism characterized by a suspicion of all generalizations). Jones notes that Karl Llewellyn
had expressed a "'distrust of the theory that traditional prescriptive rule-formulations are
the heavily operative factor in producing court decisions,"' Law and Morality, supra note
21, at 799 (emphasis in original), and that Holmes had once said that "'[gleneral proposi-
tions do not decide concrete cases,'" id. (footnote omitted).
"' Realist writing is replete with defenses of the analytical separation of the is from the
ought. Jones stresses that Llewellyn referred to the division of is and ought as "temporary";
to be made "during the investigation of the facts" as an aid to analysis. Law and Morality,
supra note 21, at 808 n.32 (citation omitted). For a cogent criticism of this separation of is
from ought, see Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century, 6 J. LzGAL Enuc. 457,
468-73 (1954). Compare Fuller, A Rejoinder to Professor Nagel, 3 NAT. L.F. 83, 86-92 (1958)
(evaluation of a law is incomplete without an examination of the value it is meant to serve)
with Nagel, On the Fusion of Fact and Value: A Reply to Professor Fuller, 3 NAT. L.F. 77,
78-80 (1958) (Fuller's attack on the separation of is from ought assumes the existence of the
separation).
3 R. DIAS, supra note 9, at 474; see An Invitation, supra note 2, at 1024-26; infra notes 69-
86 and accompanying text. Specifically, Jones observes "'that a body of law is more rational
and more civilized when every rule it contains is referred articulately and definitely to an
end which it subserves, and when the grounds for desiring that end are stated or are ready
to be stated in words.'" An Invitation, supra note 2, at 1024 (quoting Holmes, supra note
10, at 485-86). Jones felt that this "ends-in-view" approach to the law was an internal pro-
cess "inescapable in the system's functioning." An Invitation, supra note 2, at 1025.
Jones' views were influenced in part by the adherents of sociological jurisprudence, a
school of thought that arose in the first part of the 20th century. See R. DIAS, supra note 9,
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statement are immense, and notwithstanding Professor Jones' disinterest
in doctrinal implications, two comments are in order. First, standing
alone, this position directly implies that the value or worth of a law (and
here it would appear that Jones speaks of law as lex, as opposed to law as
jus)3s is to be measured in utilitarian terms, that is, in terms of the ability
of the law to bring about certain unspecified social ends. Under such an
approach, the moral content of a law is definitionally of no consequence.
Second, questions as to the authority to create law are irrelevant, unless
the method of creating the law somehow affects its utility. We are right to
ponder the desirablity of either implication.
Professor Jones then moves to an interesting twist on typical Ameri-
can Legal Realist thinking. While refusing to incorporate ought consider-
ations into his analysis of the is, he introduces a hybrid factor in describ-
ing it, namely, what law is for."6 For Jones, descriptive analysis of what
the law is is not to be found in normative principles, but in utilitarian
service to social ends.37
From this pragmatic evaluation of law, Jones derives two attributes
of law: durability and goodness. According to Jones, "the durability of a
legal principle, its reliability as a source of guidance for the future, is
determined far more by the principle's social utility, or lack of it, than by
its verbal elegance or formal consistency with other legal precepts.' ' "
at 453. Among the prominent Americans who subscribed to this school was Dean Pound. Id.
Justices Cardozo and Holmes also shared the belief that policy considerations play a key
role in judicial decisionmaking. See E. BODENHEIMER, supra note 30, at 121-24.
" Law, in the abstract sense, is known as jus. M. SErHNA, supra nte 26, at 110. Law, in the
concrete sense, is known as lex. Id. The difference between the/two is that lex refers to
specific laws, id. at 110-11, while jus refers to laws and legal principles as a whole, id. at 109-
11. Therefore, when Jones speaks of the utilitarian nature of a law, he is speaking of a
specific law and not of law in the collective sense.
" An Invitation, supra note 2, at 1024. "[Q]uestions of what the law is, or is likely to be-
come, are inextricably bound up with questions of what the law is for." Id. Jones suggests
that the law should be shaped according to the ends it is meant to serve. For example, if it
can be established that an existing law serves socially disadvantageous ends, "more likely
than not. . . [it] will be abolished." Id. at 1025. Jones points out, however, that this view
does not put him in agreement with Fuller, who states that the "is" of a legal rule must be
viewed in terms of its purpose. Fuller, American Legal Philosophy, supra note 33, at 470-71.
Jones explains that Fuller believes that "the sharp dichotomy between fact and evaluation
cannot be maintained," id. at 470, because fact is not static, but rather reaches toward an
objective, and thus can be understood only in terms of that reaching, id. To Jones, however,
"the distinction between fact and value is... inescapable." Law and Morality, supra note
21, at 808 n.32.
" See An Invitation, supra note 2, at 1053. One commentator has noted that "[it is per-
haps the most characteristic facet of the realist movement in jurisprudence that its repre-
sentatives tend to minimize the normative . . . element in law." E. BODENHEIMER, supra
note 30, at 124.
An Invitation, supra note 2, at 1025.
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Jones notes that the process of reevaluation of law, whereby the utility of
legal precepts is tested, occurs much more slowly in private fields of
law-such as contracts or propertyas-where the parties are likely to have
made their plans in accordance with the known state of the law, thereby
avoiding undue hardships in the wake of swift changes.
Building upon this conception of a durable law, Jones proposes his
definition of a good law: "A legal rule or legal institution is a good rule or
institution when-that is, to the extent that-it contributes to the estab-
lishment and preservation of a social environment in which the quality of
human life can be spirited, improving, and unimpaired."' This, then, is
what law is for.
It might be argued that under Jones' analysis, we have a guiding
principle for law-utilitarianism. Moreover, this utilitarian principle is
flavored by quasi-normative concepts of "spiritedness" and "creativity."
But if man and society are to be spared the risks of moral relativism at-
tendant to utilitarian legal systems, substantive considerations beyond
spiritedness and creativity are needed. Additionally, these considerations
must be spelled out clearly.41
In the remaining materials surveyed in this study, Jones offers an
elaboration on the goal of a human society that is spirited, improving,
and unimpaired. He casts the ends of law themselves as a means to
human "contentment, creativity, and happiness."' Recognizing Jones'
utilitarian perspective on law, we may now consider the five ways in
which he suggests that law contributes to a society.
SECURrY, RESOLUTION AND DIRECTION
Characteristically, Jones limits his discussion of the task of law to
contemporary human society. More precisely, he sees law as the means of
establishing "certain minimum conditions" which human experience has
found to be essential in fostering societal creativity and order."3 Jones
asserts, moreover, that these conditions can be brought about and main-
tained by law alone."
The first two of these minimum conditions (and Jones does not claim
"Id.
0 Id. at 1030 (emphasis in original).
4, I am grateful to Dr. Peter Markie, University of Missouri at Columbia, Department of
Philosophy, for calling this additional point to my attention.
"' An Invitation, supra note 2, at 1026.
3 Id.; see also J. GRAY, supra note 10, at 89 (the law of courts is derived from the "common
consciousness of the people"). See generally Ehrlich, The Sociology of Law, 36 HAiv. L
Rxv. 129, 130-31 (1922) (universal legal ideas are based on fundamental social institutions
and relations).
" An Invitation, supra note 2, at 1026.
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to have identified all of them) are necessary to society's very existence:
the maintenance of the public peace and safety, and the establishment of
reliable procedures for dispute resolution. 8 Jones, with little comment,
ranks these among law's highest social-ends-in-view.' 6 He then considers
three of law's other social ends-in-view, which are necessary to social
tranquility if not to basic social existence. Jones derives these conditions
from his observations on the good society.
By almost anybody's definition, a good society is, among other things, a so-
ciety in which creativity is unhobbled by constant apprehensions, diversity
flourishes without group or class hostility, and inevitable social change is
accepted not as something terrifying but as something to be planned for.
We are brought, then, to three other of law's social ends-in-view: (1) the
,maintenance of a reasonable security of individual expectations, (2) the res-
olution of conflicting social interests, and (3) the channeling of social
change.'
7
In establishing security of individual expectations as one of law's so-
cial ends-in-view, Jones relies heavily on Jeremy Bentham, "whose ideas
on man and society retain a surprising freshness for those who will read
him without textbook preconceptions."' 8 Bentham viewed security of in-
dividval expectations as being of paramount importance.'" He had gone
so far as to argue that even constitutional liberties were, in actuality,
guarantees of individual expectations of freedom from arbitrary govern-
mental interference.50
Jones illustrates the law's solicitude for individual expectations with
three examples: the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws,
the policy of prospective overruling of prior decisions, and the special
force of stare decisis in contract and property law.5 1 In this last example,
Jones directs attention to the work of legal counsel, who likely are seeking
the best means to secure their clients' expectations on such matters as
48 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
40 Id.; see also The Creative Power, supra note 3, at 142.
' An Invitation, supra note 2, at 1026-27; see J. BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 67-
68, 90-91 (R. Hildreth trans. 1975). Bentham identifies security as a distinctive quality of
civilization which the law alone insures. Id. at 67. "Expectation," in his view, is man's
unique ability to make future plans and commitments. See id. at 68. The law thus should
serve as a continuum that not only secures man from current loss but "guarantees him, as
far as possible, [in his expectations] against future loss." Id.; Montague, Introduction to J.
BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 38-39 (F. Montague ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as
J. BENTHAM, FRAGMENr ON GOVERNMENT].
" An Invitation, supra note 2, at 1026-27; see J. BENTHAM, FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT,
supra note 49, at 39-40; The Creative Power, supra note 3, at 142.
" An Invitation, supra note 2, at 1027.
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wills, trusts, negotiations, and settlements, rather than trying to remedy
past difficulties.8 He concludes that assessment of a judicial opinion or a
legislative enactment is incomplete if it does not ask Bentham's question:
how does this decision affect the individual's expectations? 8
Dean Roscoe Pound provides Jones with the second element of social
tranquility which is to be served by law: the resolution of conflicting so-
cial interests." Examining Pound's A Survey of Social Interests," Jones
concurs with Pound's view that one of law's central tasks is the manage-
ment of inevitable group conflicts." Dean Pound asserts:
Looked at functionally, the law is an attempt to satisfy, to reconcile, to har-
monize, to adjust these overlapping and often conflicting claims and de-
mands... so as to give effect to the greatest total of interests or the inter-
ests that weigh most in our civilization, with the least sacrifice to the
scheme of interests as a whole."7
Of course, the resolution of major conflicting social interests, at least
in a democracy, should be undertaken by the legislature, a point too eas-
ily overlooked by modern courts. But for Pound, judicial treatment even
of constitutional issues was to be assessed not in terms of "correctness" of
the decision, but by considering how thoughtfully and disinterestedly a
Id. According to Jones, the legal services programs of the 1960's can be viewed as a means
whereby the law worked to secure the expectations of the poor-not merely to afford guar-
antees to the more affluent. Id.; see Law and Morality, supra note 21, at 808-09. Daily
choices made by practicing lawyers, such as moral choices, shape the course of the law. See
id. See generally J. HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES 271-72 (1977)
(categories of law's social involvements).
'3 An Invitation, supra note 2, at 1028; see J. BENTIAM, FRAGMENT ON GOVENMENT, supra
note 49, at 39.
See Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARv. L. Rav. 1, 2 (1943); An Invitation,
supra note 2, at 1028-29. Social interests, as opposed to individual or public interests, are
"claims or demands or desires involved in social life in civilized society." Pound, supra, at 2.
Pound describes the 19th-century distrust of public policy, based on "a weighing of the
social interest in the general security against other social interests which men had sought to
secure through an overwide magisterial discretion." Id. at 6. Pound acknowledges that there
is no comprehensive scheme of public policies, but recognizes three general types of social
interests-those ensuring stability of social institutions, those maintaining general morals
and those promoting individual freedom of action. Id. at 7-8. The law works "to satisfy, to
reconcile, to harmonize, [or) to adjust" competing and conflicting interests--either by secur-
ing individual interests or by sacrificing them to the overall interests of society. Id. at 39; see
R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHI.OSOPHV OF LAW 99 (1977). Pound hopes to find in
legal history a record of a "continually more efficacious social engineering." Id. at 99; see
also Jones, Law and the Idea of Mankind, 62 COLUM. L. REy. 753, 761-62 (1962) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Law and the Idea] (discussion of conflicting group interests).
'6 See supra note 54.
' See An Invitation, supra note 2, at 1028; see also Pound, supra note 54, at 9 (the legal
means of satisfying conflicts must be flexible).
"' Pound, supra note 54, at 39.
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court weighed the conflicting social interests presented in a case."8 Again,
methodology, not substantive content, is the key for the American Legal
Realists. This idea of deliberate and disinterested decisionmaking will re-
appear strongly in Jones' approach to the appellate process. Jones does
not assert that the mere existence of law will bring about the tranquil
resolution of conflicting social interests. Instead, he contends that the law
has only the goal of striking a delicate balance, of finding a "reasoned
accommodation" among competing social interests." Compromise is thus
an important jurisprudential technique.10
The third contribution of law to social tranquility that Jones
presents is the channeling of social change. Jones, as we have seen, ac-
cepts the inevitablility of social change, though he acknowledges that not
all change has been for the better.61 The task of law, according to Jones,
is to respond to and keep pace with social change in such a manner as to
minimize impairment of other social ends-in-view, such as the preserva-
tion of the public peace and safety."1 Jones focuses attention on the im-
portance of judicial character in the process of legal development: "[tihe
channeling of social change can be accomplished only through continuing
acts of creative and informed intuition by men-and women who combine
genuine mastery of legal techniques with equally profound understanding
of social forces."' ss Not only should law adequately reflect social change,
Jones asserts, but it should responsibly facilitate beneficial changes occur-
ring in society as well." Jones also notes the oft-overlooked role of law as
teacher. "More often than not, a legal principle, if soundly conceived and
resolutely enforced, becomes a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy and creates
the social climate necessary for its acceptance. '"' He speculates as to
whether this teaching aspect of law might not be the most important way
in which law affects social change. 6 This raises some interesting points.
There is no question that Law does, at times, act as teacher in soci-
" See 3 R. POUND, JUISPRUDENcE 351-52 (1959); An Invitation, supra note 2, at 1029.
" An Invitation, supra note 2, at 1029.
See id. at 1029-30.
"See The Creative Power, supra note 3, at 138.
An Invitation, supra note 2, at 1030.
Id. at 1031.
W See id. at 1030-31; The Creative Power, supra note 3, at 136.
An Invitation, supra note 2, at 1031; see The Creative Power, supra note 3, at 135-38; see
also Gellhorn, The Law's Response to the Demand for Both Stability and Change: The
Legislative and Administrative Response, 17 VAND. L. REv. 91, 99-100 (1963) (the legisla-
ture may act creatively to restructure society by "stimulat[ing] correct conduct" and
"avoid[ing] error or abuses"). But see J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (1978) ("The only purpose
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community...
is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient
warrant").
See An Invitation, supra note 2, at 1031.
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ety, and little question that it should, at times, so act.s7 But in recogniz-
ing the teaching aspect of law, the issue of which normative principles
should guide law itself must be considered. Is it enough to assert that law
acts as a director of social change without inquiring as to which principles
should direct the law itself? For so long as one fails to ask the question,
one has answered it, in effect, affirmatively. A continuing failure to spec-
ify normative legal principles is to admit as valid any normative legal
principle purporting to direct the law. While one might hope that the
principles eventually adopted result in the advancement of common good,
one must be prepared to confront a legal system which, like that created
by the German National Socialist Party of the 1930's, cloaks the most
despicable of programs in the respectability of apparent legality. Law can
indeed create the climate for its own acceptance."
THE ETHICS OF DECISIONMAJNG
In the last part of this study, we consider Jones' application of his
general observations on law to the specific task of judges. As we shall see,
a utilitarian emphasis is given by Jones to his analysis of judicial deci-
sionmaking: "Judicial decisions, like other legal phenomena, must be ap-
praised in terms of their consequences, that is, in terms of their ser-
vice-or disservice-to the achievement of law's social ends-in-view."' 9
Jones divides judicial decisionmaking into two functions: "judicial
dispute-settlement"-the settlement of concrete disputes, and "judicial
law-making"-the creation of law through the doctrine of precedent.70
The latter term is not used in any pejorative sense by Jones, nor does he
suggest that the two functions are unrelated; only that, for the purposes
of study, it is useful to consider the functions separately.71 In our present
discussion, we must limit our remarks to Jones' observations on' judicial
lawmaking.7'
The essence of Jones' presentation of judicial lawmaking-which re-
lies largely upon the respective philosophies of Dewey and Holmes-is
17 See id.; The Creative Power, supra note 3, at 139.
See The Creative Power, supra note 3, at 138-39.
* An Invitation, supra note 2, at 1032.
7o Id. at 1032-33.
7' Id. at 1033.
1' Jones views the process of dispute resolution as being more important than the substan-
tive principles generated through judicial decisionmaking. See Law and the Idea, supra
note 54, at 761-62. This is because it is through the process of settling disputes that legal
principles are formed. Id. at 762. Dispute resolution, in Jones' view, is one mechanism by
which decisional law can shape social change and achieve other social ends-in-view as well.
See An Invitation, supra note 2, at 1032-33. As long as this role of judicial dispute settle-
ment is borne in mind, it is not inappropriate to concentrate on Jones' ideas concerning the
judicial decisionmaking process in general.
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that "judicial logic must be a logic relative to the social consequences of a
chosen rule rather than to its doctrinal antecedents." ' Despite the
strongly consequentialist phraseology of this statement, Jones actually
does not work such a complete exclusion of other normative principles.
"The general rules found in the precedents are by no means to be ignored
in this process . . but it is to be kept in mind that these inherited rules
are 'working hypotheses' and need constantly to be retested by the way
they are actually working out in society. '74
Jones continues this consequentialist emphasis in his central state-
ment of ethical theory. Note, again, the emphasis on methodology:
The ethical theory to be drawn from legal realism is, I suggest, that the
moral dimension of law is to be sought not in rules and principles, or the
higher law appraisal of rules and principles, but in the process of responsi-
ble decision, which pervades the whole of law in life.7 5
Next, Jones adopts Holmes' definition of the good judge as one who
"knows exactly what he is doing, and has to be doing, in this decisional
context and so considers definitely and explicitly the social considerations
on which the rules courts lay down must be justified. '76 Jones acknowl-
edges three ways by which judicial decisionmaking is restricted so as to
make suspect the claim that judges do, and should, engage in extended
policy consideration of social values. First, judges are "'generally
bound'" by the authoritative sources in their jurisdiction; second, they
regularly employ a "received technique17 in their deliberations, which it-
self often limits available options; and third, courts are under political
restrictions due to the separation of powers doctrine, which directs major
policy questions to the legislature.78 Jones, however, addresses these re-
strictions as follows:
These special ground rules for judicial decisionmaking are considerations to
be kept in mind in appraising the social consequences of judicial decisions,
but they in no way rule out the pragmatist-utilitarian approach to evalua-
tion of judicial law-making.... However arguable my evaluative hypothe-
sis may be as applied to any single case, certainly a body of judge-made law,
a whole line of judicial decisions in an area like manufacturer's liability or
Is An Invitation, aupra note 2, at 1036.
1, Id. This concept is also noted, with some additional caveats, in Bodenheimer, supra note
9, at 209-11.
" Law and Morality, supra note 21, at 801; see id. at 808-09.
"An Invitation, supra note 2, at 1037.
"Id. at 1038 (quoting Pound, Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems of
Law, 7 TUL. L. Rzv. 475, 481 (1933)). The term "received technique" refers to the tradi-
tional and established methods of using authoritative sources to which judges are commit-
ted. An Invitation, supra note 2, at 1038.
"An Invitation, supra note 2, at 1038.
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holder in due course, must be appraised in terms of how it is working in
society.71
It should be noted that Jones does not claim that every case that
comes before the bench is ripe for social-consideration analysis. In fact, a
number of lawyers and judges believe that as many as three-fourths of
these cases leave little or no room for judicial discretion, though Jones
himself prefers a "far lower" figure," and most realists admit that about
three-fourths of all cases fall outside the scope of social consideration
analysis6 1 Curiously enough, such observations apparently concede the
very point which American Legal Realism found so objectionable in both
Natural Law and Legal Positivism: their inability to account for concrete
decisions."
Professor Jones has shown his jurisprudential position to be one
which holds law to be a means to social ends-in-view. He has distilled this
idea into an ethical duty of judges to engage in a process of responsible
decisionmaking in furtherance of those social ends-in-view, and has gen-
erally questioned the ability of traditional legal precepts to provide the
necessary guidance to the courts in that decisionmaking process. In light
of this, Jones raises one final question: "If judges are to reach their deci-
sions by way of a genuinely informed evaluation of the probable conse-
quences of their action in the quality of human life in society, where do
they get the data they need to accomplish that design?" 3 His answer is
simply to reiterate Cardozo's classic response: "'[H]e must get his knowl-
edge . . . from experience and study and reflection; in brief, from life it-
self.',4 As a result, Jones concludes that the quality of decisional law is
limited by the quality of the judges who make it.s5 Interestingly, this con-
clusion would seem to argue, not for greater judicial discretion and activ-
ity, but rather for increased fidelity to sound legal principles.
Let us allow professor Jones to summarize his advice to judges in his
own words:
I ld. at 1038.
I d. But see B. CARDOZO, GROWTH, supra note 15, at 60 (estimating that at least nine-
tenths of all cases are "predetermined").
"3 See An Invitation, supra note 2, at 1038-39.
s Natural Law's lack of influence on modern-day legal reality in general, and judge-made
law in particular, has been conceded even by its supporters. Constable, supra note 28, at 68-
70. The positivist's difficulty in explaining the outcome of the judicial reasoning process is of
a different kind-positivism has no explanation for judicial decisions not based on express
statutory commands. See H. ROMMEN, supra note 28, at 248-49. It is suggested that by
admitting that many judicial opinions are, in fact, predetermined, legal realists implicitly
concede that their origins are unknowable.
sS An Invitation, supra note 2, at 1041.
Id. at 1043 (quoting B. CAmDozo, NATURE, supra note 15, at 113) (footnote omitted).
" An Invitation, supra note 2, at 1043.
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What does the rule of law require of [the judge]? [A]t least this: that he
be independent in the largest sense of the word, free from external direction
by any superior in the cases that come before him, and inwardly free from
the influences of personal gain and partisan. . . bias. His decisions must be
reasoned, rationally justified, in terms that take proper account both of the
demands of ongoing principle and the demands of the urgent concrete situa-
tion presented for adjudication."
Law and the Idea, supra note 54, at 768.
